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OFFENSIVE COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
AND THE LAW OF CONSPIRACY: A
NEW APPLICATION FOR A NEW
PRAGMATISM
MARVIN A. TENENBAUM*
INTRODUCTION

The scope and application of the collateral estoppel doctrine' have expanded dramatically in the last ten years. With
decisions in Blonder-Tongue Labs, Inc. v. University of Illinois
Foundation2 and Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,3 the United
States Supreme Court has recognized that the traditional, rigid
common law principles limiting the use of collateral estoppel,
e.g., mutuality of estoppel, 4 have no place in today's litigationinundated judicial system.5 In authorizing both the "offensive"
* Partner in the firm of Sachnoff Weaver & Rubenstein, Ltd., Chicago,
Illinois; former law clerk for United States District Court Judge Joel M.
Flaum (N.D. Ill.), 1976-1978; J.D., Northwestern University School of Law,
1976; B.A., Northwestern University, 1973.
The author wishes to express his appreciation to Andrew J. Annes, of
The John Marshall Law School, for his assistance in the preparation of this
article.
1. Collateral estoppel is the legal doctrine which recognizes that once
an issue has been litigated by certain parties, those parties cannot relitigate
the same issue in a subsequent action between the same parties or parties
in privity with them. As used in this article, collateral estoppel is synonymous with "issue preclusion," and is to be distinguished from res judicata,
or "claim preclusion." See, e.g., Carr v. United States, 507 F.2d 191, 193 n.5
(5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1043 (1975); United States v. Burch, 294
F.2d 1, 5 n.4 (5th Cir. 1961). Compare Kapp v. Naturelle, Inc., 611 F.2d 703,
707 (8th Cir. 1979) (res judicata or claim preclusion bars further claims
based on the same cause of action), with Speaker Sortation Systems, Div.
of A-T-O, Inc. v. United States Postal Serv., 568 F.2d 46, 48 (7th Cir. 1978)
(collateral estoppel or issue preclusion is proper when the party had a full
and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding).
2. 402 U.S. 313 (1971). See notes 51-57 and accompanying text infra.
3. 439 U.S. 322 (1979). See notes 58-80 and accompanying text infra.
4. Mutuality of estoppel requires that unless a finding made in previous litigation is binding on both parties to a subsequent action, neither
9arty can raise the finding to preclude relitigation of the issue. Parklane
osiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326-27 (1979).
5. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation,
402 U.S. 313, 322 (1971); accord, Public Serv. Mutual Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 616
F.2d 704, 707 (3d Cir. 1980) (mutuality is no longer adhered to under the law
of Pennsylvania); Fairchild, Arabatzis & Smith, Inc. v. Prometco (Produce &
Metals) Co., 470 F. Supp. 610, 617 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (mutuality of estoppel
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and "defensive" use of collateral estoppel, 6 the Court recognizes
that a more pragmatic approach to collateral estoppel is needed,
an approach which allows the doctrine truly to serve its intended purpose: the avoidance of needless and costly relitigation of issues already decided after a full and fair opportunity to
litigate those issues.
One area of substantive law in which collateral estoppel is
particularly important to private litigants is antitrust law. Congress has recently amended the Clayton Antitrust Act 7 to mandate the use of collateral estoppel against a defendant in private
civil antitrust litigation once the defendant has been convicted
of a criminal antitrust violation. 8 Congress has, accordingly, recis a "dead letter" in New York); Hann v. Carson, 462 F. Supp. 854, 864 (M.D.
Fla. 1978) (the mutuality requirement has been rejected as an essential element for the federal principles of collateral estoppel, especially in the Fifth
Circuit); In re Anthracite Coal Antitrust Lit., 78 F.R.D. 709, 720 (M.D. Penn.
1978) (the requirement of mutuality is no longer the law of the federal
courts).
That the Supreme Court has, in recent years, been quite conscious of
the overcrowded dockets in the federal courts is evident from the Court's
reference to this problem in numerous and diverse rulings. See, e.g., Santa
Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977) (refused to grant broad interpretation of rule 10b-5 for fear of "vexatious litigation"); Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. 465 (1976) (limiting the availability of habeas corpus remedies for
violations of fourth amendment rights).
Congress has likewise addressed this problem by creating 111 additional district judgeships and 25 additional circuit judgeships in 1978. S.
REP. No. 95-117, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprintedin [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD.NEws 3569, 3570. In 1950 the volume of cases fied in the district courts
was 92,000, compared with 171,600 fied in 1976. Although one might question the relevance of an overcrowded judicial system in determining the extent of substantive rights, one cannot dispute that the federal courts are
significantly overwhelmed by a litigation "explosion," and the Supreme
Court is sensitive to that fact.
6. The Supreme Court recognized defensive use of collateral estoppel
in Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S.
313 (1971). Defensive use of collateral estoppel occurs when a plaintiff has
already litigated and lost and is barred from relitigating facts against the
new defendant being sued. Offensive use of collateral estoppel, recognized
in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979), occurs when a
defendant is barred from relitigating an issue decided against him in an
action involving a different plaintiff. Thus, in the former case a prior finding
is used by a defendant as a shield, while in the latter case the already litigated issue is used by the new plaintiff as a sword. In both cases the mutuality, or identity of parties, requirement is discarded.
7. 15 U.S.C. 16(a) (1980).
8. Congress's amendment to section 5(a) of the Clayton Act was in response to a decision that a criminal antitrust conviction against a defendant
could only be used as a prima facie evidence of an antitrust violation by the
defendant in subsequent private civil antitrust proceedings. Illinois v. General Paving Co., 590 F.2d 680, 681-82) (7thCir.' 1979), cert. denied,'1444,U.S.;879
(1979). Contra, Fleer Corp. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 415 F. Supp. 176
(E.D. Penn. 1976), appeal di.smissed, (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 970
(1978); McCook v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 393 F. Supp. 256 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
Note that under the previous version of section 5(a) of the Clayton Act,
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ognized the importance to the overall deterrence scheme of the
antitrust laws of allowing private civil antitrust plaintiffs, armed
with the treble damage device, to obtain the fruits of the government's litigation of a defendant's antitrust violation. 9
An interesting issue concerning the applicability of offensive collateral estoppel in private civil antitrust suits now arises
in the context of a criminal antitrust acquittal. This issue appears for the first time due to a change in an area of law far removed from substantive antitrust law: the admissibility
requirements of the coconspirator exception to the rule against
hearsay.1 0 The juxtaposition of an expansive view of offensive
collateral estoppel against the refinement in admissibility requirements for coconspirator statements creates a situation in
which a defendant, even if acquitted of criminal antitrust
charges by a jury, might still be precluded from denying liability
in a subsequent private civil action.
COCONSPIRATOR STATEMENTS AND THE JAMES REQUIREMENTS

All jurisdictions recognize that an out-of-court statement
made by a person involved in a conspiracy, during and in furtherance of the conspiracy, is admissible against all persons involved in the conspiracy. When criminal A tells undercover
agent B that criminal A and criminal C will be glad to sell him a
kilo of heroin, if it is shown that a conspiracy exists between A
and C, B can testify to A's out-of-court statement in the trial of
C, even if A is not available or subject to cross-examination.
While such testimony seems to be classic hearsay," legal scholand the current amended version, no court has considered the possible separation of powers objection to congressional interference in the judiciary's
application of an essentially judicial matter, the evidentiary impact of a
prior criminal conviction in a subsequent private action. Cf. United States
v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872) (Legislative enactment held to invade

power of Judicial and Executive departments).
The purpose, effect and background of the Antitrust Procedural Improvement Act are set forth in H.R. REP. No. 96-874, 96 Cong., 2d Sess. 2,
reprinted in [1980] U.S. CONG. CODE & AD. NEWS 2752.
9. Id. at 2753. The report states:
Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act currently provides that a final judgment
or decree in a government action in which a defendant was found to
have violated the antitrust laws can be given rebuttable prima facie ef-

fect in subsequent antitrust actions. H.R. 4046 amends that provision to
provide that the statute shall not be construed to preclude the application of the common law doctrine of collateral estoppel in a subsequent
proceeding.
10. See

FED.

R. EvD. 801(d) (2) (E). Although referred to as the cocon-

spirator exception to the rule against hearsay, coconspirator statements are
not hearsay statements at all, but rather party admissions.
11. Hearsay is any out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of
the matter asserted therein. See Wheaton, What Is Hearsay?, 46 IowA L.
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ars have determined that these coconspirator statements should
be admissible against defendants. 12 Whether the basis for admissibility of coconspirator statements is agency theory or admission theory, 13 the fundamental rationale is the need to
obtain convictions of those involved in conspiracies. 14 Since the
nature of conspiracy is inherently secret, it is argued that unless
such statements are admissible at trial conspirators will go free.
Although the need to obtain criminal conspiracy convictions
may have led courts to ignore the rigorous requirements of the
hearsay rule, the courts have recognized that some safeguards
for defendants must be provided before out-of-court statements
made by one defendant are admissible against other defendants. These safeguards traditionally have taken the form of admissibility requirements, preliminary findings by the court
before out-of-court statements made by one defendant are admitted against others.' 5 Thus, the coconspirator statements rule
requires that before such a statement is admitted into evidence,
it must be shown 16 that: (1) a conspiracy exists; (2) the defendant against whom the statement is offered was a member of the
210-11 (1961). The statement by A to B was made out of court and was
offered to prove C was involved in the sale of heroin. The function of the
rule against hearsay has been referred to as a "testimonial triangle." See
generally Tribe, TriangulatingHearsay, 87 HARV. L. REV. 957, 958-61 (1974).
12. The defendant does not have to be charged with conspiracy for such
statements to be admissible. United States v. Rinaldi, 393 F.2d 97 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 913 (1968) (statements admissible against others,
whether or not a conspiracy is charged); United States v. Messina, 388 F.2d
393 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1026 (1968) (statements admissible
even though indictment did not charge defendants with conspiracy).
13. See generally Levie, Hearsay and Conspiracy: A Reexamination of
the Co-conspirators'Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1159
(1954); Comment, The CoconspiratorException to the Hearsay Rule. The
Limits of Its Logic, 37 LA. L. REV. 1101-09 (1977); Comment, The Hearsay
Exceptionfor Co-conspirators'Declarations,25 U. CH. L. REV. 530 (1958).
14. Not surprisingly, some authors have challenged the propriety of admission of coconspirator statements because of its pragmatic rationale as
opposed to its validity under pure legal analysis. See generally Comment,
The CoconspiratorException to the HearsayRule: The Limits of its Logic,
37 LA. L. REV. 1101-09 (1977); J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1080 (3d ed. 1940).
The Supreme Court, however, has recognized the validity of admission
of coconspirator statements in the face of confrontation clause challenges.
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970). See also Davenport, The Confrontation Clause and the Co-conspiratorException in CriminalProsecutions: A
FunctionalAnalysis, 85 HARV. L REV. 1378 (1972).
15. See, e.g., FED. R. EvrD. 104. See also United States v. De Lazo, 497
F.2d 1168, 1170 (3d Cir. 1974); United States v. Bey, 437 F.2d 188, 190 (3d Cir.
1971).
16. It is relatively well settled for those who accept the validity of the
coconspirator statement rule that it is the court which makes the findings of
admissibility. United States v. Bell, 573 F.2d 1040 (8th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Hansen, 569 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Stanchich, 550
F.2d 1294 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Petrozziello, 548 F.2d 20 (1st Cir.
1977). However, under prior law, the jury determined when coconspirator
REV.
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conspiracy shown to exist; and (3) the statement made by the
coconspirator was made in furtherance and during the existence
of the conspiracy.' 7 Moreover, only independent evidence of the
defendant's own actions and statements can be used to make
these preliminary findings; the coconspirator statements cannot
be used to establish the basis of their own admissibility. 18
Recently, the Fifth Circuit in United States v. James' 9 considered the admissibility standards for coconspirator statestatements could be used against a defendant. Thus, the LaBuy jury instruction on conspiracy provided:
To convict any defendant of this offense the Government must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of a conspiracy to commit the
offense ....
In determining whether a conspiracy existed, the jury should consider
the actions and declarations of all of the alleged participants. However,
in determining whether a particular defendant was a member of the
conspiracy, if any, the jury should consider only his acts and statements. He cannot be bound by the acts or declarations of other participants until it is established that a conspiracy existed, and that he was
one of its members.
If it is established beyond a reasonable doubt that a conspiracy existed,
and that the defendant was one of its members, then the acts and declarations of any other member of such conspiracy in or out of such defendant's presence, done in furtherance of the objects of the
conspiracy, and during its existence, may be considered as evidence
against such defendant.

LABuY,

JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES,

Seventh Circuit

Judicial Conference Committee on Jury Instructions § 10.00 (1965).
Note that this instruction, which for years was accepted law, is totally
irrational. By requiring the jury first to determine that a conspiracy existed
and the defendant was a member of it beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury
was being told to find the defendant guilty before it could find him "guiltier"
by using coconspirator statements. See United States v. Santiago, 582 F.2d

1128, 1132 (7th Cir. 1978) ("[t]o expect such a precise untainted jury per-

formance must strain the confidence of even the most ardent admirers of
the jury system, and is unnecessary").
17. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 801(d) (2) (E) which provides: "A statement is
not hearsay if ....
[t]he statement is offered against a party and is ... a

statement by a co-conspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy." See also United States v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353

(9th Cir. 1976) (discussing the necessary elements of a conspiracy indictment).

18. E. DEvrrr & C. BLACKMAR, PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 27.05 (3d
ed. 1977) provides:
In determining whether a conspiracy existed, the jury should consider
the actions and declarations of all of the alleged participants. However,
in determining whether a particular defendant was a member of the
conspiracy, if any, the jury should consider only his acts and statements. He cannot be bound by the acts or declarations of other participants until it is established that a conspiracy existed, and that he was
one of its members.
Id. (emphasis added).

19. 590 F.2d 575 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1980).

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 14:605

ments and set forth guidelines trial courts must follow in
determining whether such statements are admissible. 20 Because the situation in which a court must make preliminary
findings of "guilt" before the jury decides identical issues is
unique, 2 1 the court's coconspirator statement admissibility rules
required two preliminary findings. When a statement is offered
by the government, the James court requires that before allowing the jury to hear the evidence the trial court must find
substantialevidence that a conspiracy exists, the defendant was
a member of the conspiracy, and the statement was made in furtherance of the conspiracy. 22 While some courts have held these
findings based on substantial evidence 23 to be sufficient to let
coconspirator statements go to the jury for consideration as evidence in the case, 24 the court in James required the trial court to
make further findings before submitting the statements to the
jury as evidence. The Fifth Circuit held that before the coconspirator statements are admissible, at the close of all the evidence in the case, and after considering all the evidence, the
court must determine by a preponderanceof the evidence that:
(1) a conspiracy exists; (2) the defendant against whom the
coconspirator statements are offered is a member of the conspiracy; and (3) the statements were made in furtherance and dur25
ing the course of the conspiracy.
20. Courts have been grappling with the admissibility requirements for

years. See 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 801-166
(1979). How this issue will finally be decided is not clear, and a discussion
of such a resolution is outside the scope of this article.
21. It should be noted that the coconspirator statement rule is unique in
the nature of its admissibility requirements. While the courts must make
many preliminary findings of admissibility (see note 15 supra), only in conspiracy law is the court making a preliminary finding on the ultimate issue
that the jury must resolve to convict or acquit. In fact, like the common law
of treason where the substantive law itself contains an evidentiary component (the need for two witnesses of overt treasonous activity, Cramer v.
United States, 325 U.S. 1 (1945)), the substantive law of conspiracy requires
juries to consider only certain evidence, the acts of the defendant, before
they can convict.
22. United States v. James, 590 F.2d 575, 581 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
442 U.S. 917 (1980).
23. "Substantial evidence," although defined in some places as more
than a scintilla and less than a preponderance of evidence, is not a precisely
defined standard.
24. United States v. Peterson, 549 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1977) (requiring only
slight evidence); United States v. Calaway, 524 F.2d 609 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 967 (1975) (slight evidence required).
25. United States v. James, 590 F.2d 575, 582-83 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1980). The Court stated:
Regardless of whether the proof has been made in the preferred order,
or the coconspirator's statement has been admitted subject to later connection, on appropriate motions at the conclusion of all the evidence
the court must determine as a factual matter whether the prosecution
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It should be remembered that a court making the required
James findings does not find the defendant guilty. The jury in
criminal cases is required to find the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. 26 But even if the defendant is acquitted, the
trial court has been required to find, on the basis of all the evidence, that the defendant was a member of a conspiracy by a
preponderance of the evidence, that is, by the civil standard of
proof.2 7 It is these findings which this article contends are avail-

able to private plaintiffs in civil antitrust actions to preclude defendants acquitted in criminal cases from relitigating their
participation in a price-fixing conspiracy. Once these findings
are made, defendants in criminal antitrust actions effectively
have been found liable for damages to the plaintiffs they have
injured by their antitrust conspiracies. That these judicial findings of conspiracy are binding against defendants in subsequent
civil litigation is demonstrated by an analysis of Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore28 and its applicability to such James findings. 29
PARKLANE HOSIERY Co. V. SHORE AND OFFENSIVE

COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL

In Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,30 the United States
Supreme Court affirmed the trend toward expanded use of collateral estoppel. After examining the pragmatic consideration of
judicial economy, the Court rejected archaic and technical prerequisites which had hampered application of a doctrine meant
has shown by a preponderance of the evidence independent of the
statement itself (1) that a conspiracy existed, (2) that the coconspirator
and the defendant against whom the coconspirator's statement is offered were members of the conspiracy, and (3) that the statement was
made during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.
If after allowing the jury to hear the evidence and then finding the evidence of conspiracy did not meet the admissibility requirement, the court
must decide whether to declare a mistrial or instruct the jury to disregard
the coconspirator's statements.
26. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (the Court mandated all criminal
convictions to be based on beyond a reasonable doubt standard).
27. See, e.g., Se-Ling Hosiery, Inc. v. Margulies, 364 Pa. 45, 47, 70 A.2d 854,
856 (1950).
28. 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
29. The situation hypothesized above, an acquittal in a criminal antitrust case after James findings were made, is not unrealistic. In fact, this

situation arose in In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Lit., M.D.L. 310

[1981] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 63,810 (S.D. Tex.). In Corrugatedthe trial court
expressly made James findings and the defendant was acquitted. The collateral estoppel issues discussed herein were not raised during the civil antitrust actions which resulted in a judgment against the defendant after a

jury trial.
30. 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
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to deter needless relitigation of issues. 3 1 In an opinion delivered
ratified the nonmutual offensive
by Justice Stewart, 32 the Court
33
use of collateral estoppel.
The plaintiffs in Parklane brought a stockholder class action
suit for violations of sections 14(a), 10(b), and 20(a) of the Se-

curities Exchange Act of 1934, 34 as well as various rules and reg-

ulations promulgated thereunder by the Securities Exchange
Commission (SEC). 35 The complaint alleged that defendants
had issued a materially false and misleading proxy statement in
connection with a merger. Before the jury trial in the private
action for money damages began, the SEC initiated a separate
enforcement action for declaratory and injunctive relief against
the same defendants. 36 The SEC suit alleged that the proxy
statement was materially false and misleading in essentially the
same respects as had been alleged by plaintiffs in the private
action.- After a four day bench trial in the government action,
that the proxy statement
the court found for the SEC and ruled
37
was false and misleading as alleged.
The plaintiffs in the private class action then moved for
summary judgment on the issue of whether the proxy statement
was false and misleading. They contended that the issue already had been decided against the defendants in the prior SEC
suit and should not be relitigated. The motion was denied by
the trial court, but the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.38 The appellate court was not persuaded by defendant's
31. See, e.g., Oldham v. Pritchett, 599 F.2d 274 (8th Cir. 1979). As a

branch of the doctrine of res judicata, collateral estoppel serves both judi-

cial and private interests in the final termination of litigation. In the context
of the judicial system, collateral estoppel principles serve primarily to conserve time and resources; at the same time, the application of collateral estoppel is a means by which a litigant may avoid unnecessary expenses and
potential harassment by lawsuit, and avoid conflicting rights and duties
arising from inconsistent findings. Id. at 278.
32. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 323 (1979).
33. Id. at 331. The Court concluded that the preferable approach for
dealing with offensive collateral estoppel was to grant trial courts broad discretion to apply the doctrine rather than absolutely to preclude its use.

34. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(a), 78j(b), and 78t(a).
35. 439 U.S. at 324.
36. Id. at 325. See SEC v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 422 F. Supp. 477

(S.D.N.Y. 1976), affd, 558 F.2d 1083 (2d Cir. 1977).

37. 439 U.S. at 325.
38. The trial court denied the motion because it reasoned that application of collateral estoppel would deny the defendants their seventh amendment right to a jury trial. The Second Circuit reversed, stating that a party

who had factual issues determined against it after a full and fair opportu-

nity to litigate in a nonjury trial is collaterally estopped from obtaining a
subsequent trial of the same issues. Once the issues have been fully and
fairly litigated, nothing remains for trial, either with or without a jury.

Shore v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 565 F.2d 815, 819 (2d Cir. 1977).
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arguments that application of collateral estoppel in this situation would be unfair, or that it would deny defendants their seventh amendment right to a jury trial. An antithetical result in
the Fifth Circuit prompted the Supreme Court to grant certio39
rari and address these issues.
The Supreme Court focused on two matters. First, the
Court considered whether to recognize offensive, nonmutual
collateral estoppel. 4° Second, the Court addressed the issue of
whether offensive use of collateral estoppel should be prohibited when it would apparently deny a party the right to a jury
trial on the issues previously decided. 4 1 Recognizing the need to
promote judicial efficiency, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Second Circuit.42
A traditional requirement of common law collateral estoppel had been mutuality of estoppel. 43 Under the doctrine of mutuality, the party invoking the prior findings as a bar to
relitigation must have been similarly bound as a party, or in
privity with a party to the previous decision.44 The requirement
39. The Fifth Circuit encountered a similar problem with respect to the
jury question and had decided to deny collateral estoppel effect to certain
prior findings. The Fifth Circuit decision is ambiguous as to whether the

court felt that a jury trial was a constitutional requirement in these situations, or whether under collateral estoppel principles it was unfair to let
prior judicial findings bind a party engaged in a subsequent jury trial. See
Rachal v. Hill, 435 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 904 (1971).
See Shapiro & Coquillette, The Fetish of Jury Trial in Civil Cases: A Comment on Rachal v. Hill, 85 HARv. L. REV. 442, 448 (1971).

40. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979). "Specifically,
we must determine whether a litigant who was not a party to a prior judgment may nevertheless use that judgment 'offensively' to prevent a defendant from relitigating issues resolved in the earlier proceeding."
The issue of nonmutual, defensive collateral estoppel was considered
by the Court in Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971), where the Court rejected the archaic prerequisite
of mutuality.

41. 439 U.S. at 333. "The question that remains is whether, notwithstanding the law of collateral estoppel, the use of offensive collateral estoppel in this case would violate the petitioners' Seventh Amendment right to a
jury trial."

42. The underlying purpose of collateral estoppel has been to terminate
litigation and conserve judicial resources. See, e.g., Continental Can Co.,
U.S.A. v. Marshall, 603 F.2d 590, 594 (7th Cir. 1979); Johnson v. United States,
576 F.2d 606, 609-10 (5th Cir. 1978); Southwest Airlines Co. v. Texas Int'l Airlines, 546 F.2d 84, 94 (5th Cir. 1977); Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d
419, 421 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 865 (1950). See also note 5 and accompanying text supra.
43. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co.,
225 U.S. 111 (1912). See also 1B MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.41211], at

1803-04 (2d ed. 1974).
44. 1B MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.44113], at 3781 (2d ed. 1974). See
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326-27 (1979); Blonder-Tongue
Labs., Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 320-21 (1971).

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 14:605

was based on the notion that it would be unfair to allow a party
to use a prior finding as an estoppel when that party would not
be bound by the same decision. 45 But courts and commentators
began to question whether it was economically feasible to afford
a litigant more than one fair opportunity to litigate a matter regardless of the mutuality of estoppel. 46 It served both judicial
and private interests to preclude litigation of issues by a party to
a subsequent action, regardless of whether the previously re47
solved action was binding on others.
Courts began to limit their concern to whether the party
against whom estoppel is invoked had a full and fair opportunity
to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding. 48 Attention was directed toward actualfairness to the litigant, not to whether
there was mutuality. The court in Bernhard v. Bank of
America 49 concluded:
No satisfactory rationalization has been advanced for the requirement of mutuality. Just why a party who was not bound by a
previous action should be precluded from asserting it as [collateral
estoppel] against a party who was bound by it is difficult to comprehend.
In determining the validity of a plea of [collateral estoppel]
three questions are pertinent: Was the issue decided in the prior
action identical with the one presented in the action in question?
Was there a final judgment on the merits? Was the party against
whom the plea is asserted
a party or in privity with a party to the
50
prior adjudication?
45. 439 U.S. at 327. The concept of mutuality has been defended as a
necessary element of collateral estoppel. Moore & Currier, Mutuality and
Conclusiveness of Judgments, 35 TUL. L. REv. 301, 308-11 (1961). However,

there were recognized exceptions to the mutuality requirement. See, e.g.,

Portland Gold Mining Co. v. Stratton's Independence Ltd., 158 F. 63, 65-69
(8th Cir. 1907).
46. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402
U.S. 313, 328 (1971).
47. See, e.g., Cramer v. General Tel. &Elec. Corp., 582 F.2d 259, 267-68 (3d
Cir. 1978); Johnson v. United States, 576 F.2d 606, 614 (5th Cir. 1978); Speaker
Sortation Sys., Div. of A-T-O, Inc. v. United States Postal Serv., 568 F.2d 46,
48-49 (7th Cir. 1978). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS Appendix 88, Comment b at 162-63 (Tent. Draft No. 3,1976).
48. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979); accord, Red Lake
Band v. United States, 607 F.2d 930 (Ct. Cl. 1979); Continental Can Co.,
U.S.A. v. Marshall, 603 F.2d 590 (7th Cir. 1979) (collateral estoppel does not
apply to issues that might have been litigated, but were not; nor does it
apply to any matter not essential to the judgment in the prior adjudication);
United States v. Jensen, 608 F.2d 1349, 1355 (10th Cir. 1979) (even though the
present party was a nominal party in the prior case, the test to be used for
purposes of collateral estoppel is whether the party had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior case).
49. 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942).
50. Id. at 812-13, 122 P.2d at 895 (emphasis added).
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The Supreme Court in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories,Inc. v.
University of Illinois Foundation5 1 finally abandoned the mutuality requirement,5 2 but the Court in that case was not compelled to venture beyond the boundaries of defensive collateral
estoppel.53 Notwithstanding its limited scope, Blonder-Tongue
strongly advocated consideration of actual fairness to the litigants and conservation of judicial resources.5 4 The Court stated
that "[i] n any lawsuit where a defendant, because of the mutuality principle, is forced to present a complete defense on the
merits to a claim which the plaintiff has fully litigated and lost in
'55
a prior action, there is an arguable misallocation of resources.
Thus, the Court seemed content to conclude that "[a]lthough
neither judges, the parties, nor the adversary system performs
perfectly in all cases, the requirement of determining whether
the party against whom an estoppel is asserted had a full and
'56
fair opportunity to litigate is a most significant safeguard.
The Blonder-Tongue decision, although limited to defensive
collateral estoppel, 57 established the direction and attitude of
the Supreme Court toward collateral estoppel and also ratified
the removal of a needless barrier to effective use of the doctrine.
While most courts eagerly accepted the Blonder-Tongue decision and abandoned mutuality as a prerequisite in defensive collateral estoppel situations, 58 the courts appeared hesitant to
expand the trend to include offensive use circumstances. The
courts considered two factors which warranted a refusal to allow
51. 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
52. Id. at 327-29.

53. In this context, offensive use of collateral estoppel occurs when
the plaintiff seeks to foreclose the defendant from litigating an issue the
defendant has previously litigated in an action with another party. Defensive use occurs when a defendant seeks to prevent a plaintiff from
asserting a claim the plaintiff has previously litigated and lost against
another defendant.
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.4 (1979). See also 1B
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.412[1, at 1807 (2d ed. 1974); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 88, Comment d (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1976).
54. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402
U.S. 313, 328 (1971).

55. Id. at 329.
56. Id.

57. Id. The mutuality requirement and its evolution are discussed at
length in Callen &Kadue, To Bury Mutuality, Not to PraiseIt: An Analysis
of CollateralEstoppel after ParklaneHosiery Co. v. Shore, 31 HAST. L.J. 755
(1980).

58. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 (1979); Blonder-Tongue Labs.,
Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 324-27 (1971). Accord,

Griffin v. Burns, 570 F.2d 1065, 1072 (1st Cir. 1978); Windham v. American
Brands, Inc., 565 F.2d 59, 69 n.30 (4th Cir. 1977); Gerrard v. Larsen, 517 F.2d
1127, 1131-32 (8th Cir. 1975). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS Appendix 88, Comment at 162-63 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1976).
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offensive use of collateral estoppel even when mutuality of estoppel was no longer an issue.
First, offensive collateral estoppel allowed plaintiffs to take
advantage of another's victories without being bound by their
losses. 59 This differed from defensive collateral estoppel, which
prompted plaintiffs to join all possible defendants in one action.
The Court stated that "[sJince a plaintiff will be able to rely on a
previous judgment against a defendant but will not be bound by
that judgment if the defendant wins, the plaintiff has every incentive to adopt a 'wait and see' attitude, in the hope that the
first action by another plaintiff will result in a favorable judgment. '60 A second argument against recognition of offensive
collateral estoppel was that it could be unfair to the defendants. 61 In instances where the defendant does not have a proper
incentive to litigate, 62 or is forced to defend in an inconvenient
forum or at an inconvenient time, application of collateral estop63
pel might be unjustified.
Despite these problems, the Court in Parklane decided to
sustain the expansive trend to include the offensive use situations. 64 The pragmatic concerns of avoiding wasteful and unnecessary relitigation enunciated in Blonder-Tongue resurfaced in
Parklane and prompted the Court to conclude "that the preferable approach for dealing with these problems in the federal
courts is not to preclude the use of offensive collateral estoppel,
but to grant trial courts broad discretion to determine when it
should be applied. '65 Giving the courts discretion would remedy the problems which distinguished defensive from offensive
collateral estoppel. The Court emphasized actual fairness to the
litigant while still striving toward judicial economy.
The Court in Parklane outlined four factors to be considered by courts in exercising this discretion. These guidelines
were based on the need to assure that a defendant had a full and
59. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 329-30 (1979).
60. Id. at 330. Because the courts were concerned with apparent unfairness in allowing a party to reap the benefits of another's victory, see, e.g.,
Adamson v. Hill, 202 Kan. 482, 487, 449 P.2d 536, 541 (1969); Nevarov v. Cald-

well, 161 Cal. App. 2d 762, 767-68, 327 P.2d 111, 115, 135 Cal. Rptr. 862, 867-68
(1958), some courts adopted the requirement that the party asserting the
collateral estoppel must have been unable to join the prior action. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS

§ 88(3) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1975).

61. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 330 (1979).
62. Bemer v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, 346 F.2d 532, 540 (2d
Cir. 1965) (collateral estoppel denied where party did not foresee future

lawsuit).
63. 439 U.S. at 331 n.15.
64. Id. at 331.
65. Id.
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fair opportunity to litigate the matter in the prior proceeding.
The parameters of discretion were defined by actual fairness to
the litigants. 66 Once the party's interests were protected, the
Court recognized that there was no valid reason to prevent application of offensive collateral estoppel.
First, the Court was confident that it was not rewarding a
plaintiff who could have joined the previous action. 67 This consideration addressed the problem of a party's adopting a "wait
and see" attitude. 68 The Court was not going to permit a party to
take advantage of another's victory without being bound by his
loss. Thus, whenever possible, the party seeking to use prior
findings offensively must join the prior proceeding if possible,
and failure to join when permitted will be fatal to an application
of offensive collateral estoppel.
Second, the party against whom the estoppel is sought must
have had every incentive to litigate the issue fully and vigorously in the prior proceeding. 6 9 If the subsequent litigation was
not foreseeable it might be unfair to bind a party to a prior finding.70 Again, the Court was cautious not to jeopardize actual
fairness. ThuS, it would be unfair to bind a party subsequently
to a finding in a case in which the only risk to the party was
payment of nominal damages. If there are any reasons which
would lead the court to believe that the party was not motivated
to litigate an issue actually and fully, then the offensive use of
collateral estoppel should be denied because fairness to the
party would be sacrificed improperly for judicial economy.
Third, the Court would not permit the application of offen66. Id. at 331-32. The notion of actual fairness to the litigant has been
important to the application of collateral estoppel. See, e.g., Bank of Heflin
v. Landmark Inns of America, Inc., 604 F.2d 354 (5th Cir. 1979) (the court
must use special care so as not to render unjust results); Consolidated Express, Inc. v. New York Shipping Ass'n, 602 F.2d 494, 504 (3d Cir. 1979) (as a
general rule, recognition of a judgment should be denied only upon a compelling showing of unfairness). See also Johnson v. United States, 576 F.2d
606 (5th Cir. 1978); Tipler v. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co., 443 F.2d 125 (6th
Cir. 1971); 1B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.405112], at 791 (2d ed. 1974).

67. 439 U.S. at 331-32.
68. See notes 59-60 and accompanying text supra.
69. 439 U.S. at 332. That the matter or issue was "actually litigated" is
vital to an application of collateral estoppel. United States v. Jensen, 608
F.2d 1349, 1355 (10th Cir. 1979) (even though the party was a nominal party,

the test is whether the party had a full and fair opportunity to litigate); Red
Lake Band v. United States, 607 F.2d 930 (Ct. Cl.1979) (issues are not actually litigated unless parties manifest an intent to be bound); Continental
Can Co., U.S.A. v. Marshall, 603 F.2d 590, 595 (7th Cir. 1979) (the actually
litigated requirement is generally satisfied if the parties to the original action disputed the issue and the trier of fact resolved it); In re Merrill, 594
F.2d 1064, 1067 (5th Cir. 1979) (theparty asserting an estoppel must show
that the issue was actually litigated).
70. 439 U.S. at 332.
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sive collateral estoppel when the findings being given estoppel
71
effect were inconsistent with previous findings or judgment.
Again, notions of fairness to the litigant were the concern of the
Court. It would be unfair to bind a party by one judicial resoluthe court ignored a directly contrary judition of an issue while
72
cial determination.
Finally, the Court stated that if procedural opportunities
were available in the second suit that Were not available in the
first suit, offensive collateral estoppel would be unfair.7 3 This requirement addressed problems unique to offensive collateral estoppel. Since the party against whom the doctrine is invoked
could not control the timing of the litigation or the forum, he
might find himself at a disadvantage. In such a situation the
Court felt that it would be unfair to bind him to the prior findgive him a better and fair opportuings since relitigation would
74
nity to litigate the issues.
The Court in Parklane found all these requirements satisfied in that case, and bound the defendants in the SEC action to
the prior findings of falsity in connection with the issuance of
proxy statements. There was no evidence of unfairness to the
defendants, and relitigation of the issue would have been wasteful. Actual fairness was assured, and the doctrine was invoked
to deny the defendants a second opportunity to litigate their defenses.
After sustaining the use of offensive, nonmutual collateral
estoppel, 75 and establishing the guidelines for judicial discretion, the Court in Parklane faced one more obstacle. The final
concern was whether to permit the application in instances that
apparently would deprive a party of a jury trial.7 6 The Court
held that the presence or absence of a jury trial was basically a
"neutral" factor which did not qualify as a procedural difference
77
sufficient to bar application of offensive collateral estoppel.
Under the Court's guidelines the litigant is assured a full and
fair opportunity to litigate an issue and receive a resolution of
71. Id.
72. See, e.g., Nickerson v. Pep Boys-Manny, Moe &Jack, 247 F. Supp. 221,

224 (D. Del. 1965); State Farm Fire &Cas. Co. v. Century Home Components,

Inc., 275 Or. 97, 550 P.2d 1185 (1976). See generally Currie, Civil Procedure:
The Tempest Brews, 53 CALiF. L. REV. 25, 28-33 (1965).

73. 439 U.S. at 332.
74. Id. at 331 n.15. The Court in Parklanedid not view the availability of
a jury trial as a sufficient procedural difference to cause a different result.
Id. at 332 n.19.
75. Id. at 331 n.16.
76. Id. at 333.
77. Id. at 337.
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the dispute by a neutral and impartial trier of fact.78 The Court
found no compelling reason to grant a party a second opportunity to litigate the issue merely because the initial factual determination had been by a judge and the subsequent action may
79
have allowed for a resolution by a jury.
The result of the Parklane analysis is a workable and practical guide to the application of offensive collateral estoppel. The
Court avoided archaic technicalities which had hampered the
expansion of collateral estoppel, promoted greater judicial efficiency by conserving judicial time and resources, and maintained adequate safeguards to protect the litigants' interests.
Actual fairness to the litigant became the touchstone for applicability of collateral estoppel principles.8 0
SYNTHESIZING PARKLANE AND JAMES IN THE

REALM

OF

ANTIRUST LITIGATION

When the discretionary steps outlined in Parklane for the
application of offensive collateral estoppe 81 are considered with
the James procedures for dealing with the admissibility of
coconspirator statements 82 in antitrust litigation, a unique and
proper application of collateral estoppel surfaces. Where a criminal antitrust action results in an acquittal 83 after James-type
findings that, by a preponderance of the evidence, there was a
conspiracy to violate the antitrust laws and the defendant was a
member of that conspiracy, the judge's findings are within the
scope of the Parklane decision and should be given preclusive
effect. Accordingly, though ultimately acquitted, a defendant
against whom the James findings are made should be barred
from denying his membership in a conspiracy to violate the antitrust laws in subsequent private civil actions.
James mandates that the judge make a preliminary determination as to the existence of the conspiracy, and the defend78. Id. at 332 n.19.
79. Continental Can Co., U.S.A. v. Marshall, 603 F.2d 590, 595 (7th Cir.
1979) (the actually litigated requirement is generally satisfied if the parties
to the original action disputed the issue and the trier of facts resolved it).
Callen & Kadue, To Bury Mutuality, Not to Praise It: An Analysis of Collateral Estoppel after Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 31 HAST. L.J. 755, 766-67
(1980), states that because "a jury is not required to find absolute truth, and

because repeated trials will not necessarily remedy the failings of prior trials, the question is, once the courts have done the best they can, why
should they repeat the process when no subsequent litigation either will or
is intended to determine the absolute truth?" (emphasis in original, footnotes omitted).
80. 439 U.S. at 336-37.

81. 439 U.S. at 329-31. See also notes 67-73 and accompanying text supra.
82. United States v. James, 590 F.2d 575, 582 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,

442 U.S. 917 (1980).
83. See note 29 and accompanying text supra.
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ant's membership in the conspiracy. 84 James further dictates
that determination be made by the civil standard of proof, i.e.,
by a preponderance of the evidence. 85 If the judge decides to
admit the evidence, the jury then is charged with a duty to convict using the beyond a reasonable doubt standard.8 6 But it is
the initial judicial resolution of disputed facts by the judge as
trier of fact that can be invoked in subsequent private civil antitrust litigation. Application of offensive collateral estoppel to
such findings violates none of the four requirements discussed
in Parklane. The requirements would not bar an application of
in these circumstances and, in fact, support its apthe doctrine
87
plication.
First, it cannot be argued that in the circumstances where
James-type findings were made in a criminal case application of
offensive collateral estoppel would unjustly reward a party who
intentionally avoided participating in the criminal proceeding.88
In antitrust litigation in which the criminal action precedes the
civil suit, the plaintiff simply cannot join the ongoing criminal
litigation. There is no intentional avoidance, and the civil antitrust plaintiffs seeking to offensively use the James findings of
conspiracy and membership cannot be suspected of waiting to
acquire the rewards of a decision against the defendants while
avoiding the preclusive effect of a victory by the defendants.
Thus, in the situation presented in this article, the first prerequisite enunciated by the Court in Parklane as a safeguard to unjust results is not a bar to application of offensive collateral
estoppel.
Second, the requirement outlined in Parklanethat the party
faced with an estoppel had every incentive to litigate the issue
89
decided in the first litigation is also satisfied in this situation.
The issue of whether coconspirator statements are admissible,
and concomitantly whether a defendant is a member of a price84. United States v. James, 590 F.2d 575, 582 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
442 U.S. 917 (1980).
[Alt the conclusion of all the evidence the court must determine as a
factual matter whether the prosecution has shown by a preponderance
of the evidence independent of the statement itself (1) that a conspiracy existed, (2) that the coconspirator and the defendant against whom
the coconspirator's statement is offered were members of the conspiracy, and (3) that the statement was made during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.
Id. (emphasis added).
85. Id. See also note 27 supra.

86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 581.
See notes 67-74 and accompanying text supra.
439 U.S. at 331-32.
Id. at 332. See notes 69-70 and accompanying text supra.
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fixing conspiracy, clearly would be litigated fully in the initial
criminal action. Since as a practical matter the admission of
coconspirator statements is vital to the prosecution's criminal
antitrust price-fixing case, there can be no doubt that the defendant would have every incentive to litigate the issue fully
and vehemently. Moreover, the Clayton Antitrust Act 90 has
been modified to provide offensive collateral estoppel statutorily
for a criminal conviction in an antitrust case.9 ' The earlier notion that a conviction would be only prima facie evidence of an
antitrust violation has been replaced by the more stringent, conclusive doctrine of collateral estoppel. 92 Knowledge of the possible effect of an application of collateral estoppel to issues
litigated in the criminal action is strong incentive to litigate vigorously every issue in the initial criminal proceeding. It is also
noteworthy that a criminal conviction in an antitrust case carries with it the possibility of fines up to one million dollars and
possible three year prison sentences for individuals. These are
both strong incentives to try to prevent93admission of conconspirator statements vital to a conviction.
The third consideration enunciated in Parklane prohibits
application of offensive collateral estoppel when a finding being
given collateral estoppel effect is inconsistent with a previous
judicial determination. 94 While it is true that a judge finds that
there was a conspiracy and defendant was a member of the conspiracy, and the jury acquits the defendant of the same charge,
the two findings are based on different, consistent standards of
proof. The judge, in accordance with James, uses the preponderance of the evidence test. It is this judgment which will be
invoked in the subsequent proceeding. The jury's acquittal can
be reconciled since it only found that the evidence was insufficient to meet the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. The
90. 15 U.S.C. § 16(a).
91. 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1980).
92. The action of the legislators was taken in response to uncertainty as
to the preclusive effect given a previous criminal antitrust conviction. See
Illinois v. General Paving Co., 590 F.2d 680 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
879 (1979).
The legislative action is directly contrary to Justice Rehnquist's dissent
in Parklane: "[T]he Court, for no compelling reason, will have simply added a powerful club to the administrative agencies' arsenals that even Congress was unwilling to provide them." 439 U.S. at 356.
The legislative history of the new act leaves no room for doubt that collateral estoppel, when available, should be given its full effect. The doctrine
is far more effective a deterrent than the prima facie effect given to a criminal antitrust conviction by the prior section 5(a) of the Clayton Act. See
notes 7-9 and accompanying text supra.
93. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1980).
94. 439 U.S. at 332. See notes 71-72 and accompanying text supra.
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jury's acquittal is not an inconsistent judgment since it is based
upon a higher standard of proof, and thus it is not a bar to application of collateral estoppel.
The final requirement to be considered is whether there
would be any procedural opportunities available in the second
suit that were not available in the first litigation. 95 The fact that
a judge has made the determination and resolved the issue of a
defendant's participation in a price-fixing conspiracy is no reason to bar application of the collateral estoppel doctrine. The
Parklane Court specifically ruled on the lack of a jury trial in
the prior proceeding and concluded that the presence or absence of a jury would neither render application of collateral estoppel unjust nor deprive the estopped party of any
constitutional rights. 96 Moreover, the defendant in the criminal
case is afforded an important procedural advantage in litigating
the issue of conspiracy and membership in a prior criminal proceeding, since in making the findings the criminal trial court is
not allowed to consider the statements themselves as evidence
97
of the conspiracy or the defendant's participation therein.
However, while there would be no relevant procedural advantages in a subsequent civil antitrust proceeding to a litigant
who was found to be a member of a price-fixing conspiracy during the criminal trial court's coconspirator statement admissibility determination, there are two factors which might adversely
affect the offensive use of those findings against the litigant.
First, since the issue of the offensive collateral estoppel effect of
James findings arises in the context of an acquittal, it might be
unfair to a litigant who prevailed in the prior proceeding and,
therefore, could not appeal any adverse findings made during
the course of his acquittal, to be bound by essentially unreviewable decisions. Second, it might be contended that the finding
that a defendant is a member of a price-fixing conspiracy by the
trial court making James determinations is not part of a "final"
judgment and, therefore, collateral estoppel cannot apply. However, neither consideration, when viewed in light of the more
pragmatic approach to collateral estoppel outlined by the
Supreme Court, should preclude allowing collateral estoppel effect to James findings.
Appealability
While some cases have held that collateral estoppel does
not apply to findings adverse to a successful litigant in prior liti95. Id. See note 73 and accompanying text supra.
96. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. at 333-37 (1979).
97. See note 18 supra.
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98
gation because of the apparent lack of a right to appeal, it has
also been recognized that even if a decision or finding is not appealable, such a decision can have collateral estoppel effect in
subsequent proceedings. 99 Thus, the Court in Winters v. Lavine
pointed out:
[E Jven if there were no opportunity whatsoever for Winters to appeal the Appellate Division's ruling, that decision would still retain
its preclusive effect, for the extent of preclusion produced by a
prior judicial determination of material and essential issues is not
affected by the fact that the losing party could not appeal that determination to a higher court.1 00
Moreover, it has been generally recognized that collateral estoppel applies to prior findings once they are rendered and not until
after all appellate review is completed.' 0 '
Although the James findings might not be appealable by an
acquitted defendant, this does not mean that such findings cannot be given preclusive effect. To hold otherwise would be to
ignore the Supreme Court's focus on fundamental fairness in
the initial fact finding process in determining the propriety of
allowing offensive collateral estoppel.10 2 Moreover, it is not altogether clear that an acquitted defendant could not appeal James
findings. The Supreme Court has recognized certain sui generis
situations in which a prevailing party may appeal adverse findings, especially when such findings are given collateral estoppel
03
effect.'
The lack of any right to appeal the James findings of conspiracy and membership, if it creates any concern about the ap-

98. See, e.g., Lindhiemer v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 292 U.S. 151 (1934); New
York Tel. Co. v. Maltbie, 291 U.S. 645 (1934). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68.1 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1976) (no preclusive effect to
an unreviewable judgement).
99. Johnson Co. v. Wharton, 152 U.S. 252, 261 (1894); Winters v. Lavine,
574 F.2d 46, 62 (2d Cir. 1978); FTC v. Food Town Stores, Inc., 547 F.2d 247, 249
(4th Cir. 1977); Napper v. Anderson, Henly, Shields, Bradford & Pritchard,
500 F.2d 634, 636-37 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 837 (1975); Sherman
v. Jacobson, 247 F. Supp. 261, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); William Whitman Co. v.
Universal Oil Prod. Co., 92 F. Supp. 885, 890 (D. Del. 1950).
100. 574 F.2d 46, 62 (2d Cir. 1978).
101. See, e.g., United States v: Abatti, 463 F. Supp. 596, 598-99 (S.D. Cal.
1978); Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. American Mut. Reins. Co., 459 F. Supp. 859, 865
n.7 (N.D. Ill. 1978), aff'd, 600 F.2d 1228 (7th Cir. 1979); Rodriguez v. Beame,
423 F. Supp. 906, 908 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).

102. It is also recognized that there is no constitutional right to an appeal
even in a criminal case, and, accordingly, it would be difficult to contend
that an appeal right is essential to the applicability of collateral estoppel.
See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956).
103. Partmar Corp. v. Paramount Pictures Theatres Corp., 347 U.S. 89
(1954). See Manis v. United States, 467 F. Supp. 828 (E.D. Tenn. 1979);

United Aircraft Corp. v. NLRB, 440 F.2d 85, 99 (2d Cir. 1971). See also Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326 (1980).
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plicability of collateral estoppel, can be resolved in the context
of the subsequent civil proceeding in a manner consistent with
the goals of judicial efficiency and economy underlying the
Supreme Court's pragmatic approach to collateral estoppel.
Since James findings are clearly findings of fact, even if reviewable they would be subject to reversal only if they were "clearly
erroneous." 10 4 Rather than relitigate these issues, the court in
the subsequent proceeding, consistent with the Parklane mandate of insuring fairness, can review the prior findings to determine whether they were clearly erroneous. 10 5 Such a "delayed"
review of the James findings would be subject to further review
if the subsequent proceeding were appealed.
The Supreme Court recently took note of a distinction between criminal and civil cases in the context of collateral estoppel. In Standefer v. United States,106 petitioner sought to

preclude relitigation in a subsequent criminal action of an issue
on which he was earlier acquitted. The Court rejected the application of collateral estoppel based on the government's inability
to appeal the earlier acquittal. 10 7 However, the Court noted that
all applications of collateral estoppel did not require the right to
appeal from the prior ruling. Rather, the Court stated:
[T] his case involves an ingredient not present in either BlonderTongue or Parklane Hosiery: the important federal interest in the
enforcement of the criminal law. Blonder-Tongue and ParklaneHo-

siery were disputes over private rights between private litigants.

In such cases, no significant harm flows from enforcing a rule that

affords a litigant only one full and fair opportunity to litigate an issue, and there is no10 8sound reason for burdening the courts with
repetitive litigation.
When a full and fair opportunity to litigate has been provided, as in the James situation where the court must consider
all the evidence relevant to a defendant's participation in a

price-fixing conspiracy and must base its decision on the pre104. See, e.g., Sumrall v. Resolute Ins. Co., 377 F.2d 671, 672 (5th Cir. 1967).
105. In many antitrust cases, the same judge who presides over the criminal trial will hear the civil action. Accordingly, review of the prior record
will create no significant burden on the court. See Oldham v. Prichett, 599
F.2d 274,

281 (8th Cir.

1979).

106. 447 U.S. 10 (1980).

107. Id. at 23-24.
108. Id. at 24. The Supreme Court stated, however, that the doctrine of
collateral estoppel is premised upon an underlying confidence that the previous result was substantially correct, and in the absence of appellate review such confidence is unwarranted. Id. n.18. This statement is surprising
in light of the Court's previous rulings that appeals are not required by due
process, and collateral estoppel applies even in the absence of appellate review. See notes 99-102 and accompanying text supra. The Supreme Court
ignored these doctrines in Standefer.

1981]

Offensive Collateral Estoppel

ponderance of the evidence, a litigant has been assured of a fair
decision in court. Lack of an optional appellate review does not
render the prior finding unreasonable, incorrect, or unfair, and
should not preclude a court from exercising its discretion to
grant collateral estoppel effect to James findings.
Finality

Like the mutuality requirement, traditional notions of collateral estoppel have required that before a finding can be used
to preclude relitigation the finding must be part of a "final" judgment. This requirement of a final judgment was meant to assure
fairness to the party against whom the preclusion was sought,
and to insure that the findings were necessary to the rendition
of a thoughtful and complete judicial determination. 10 9 However, in determining the existence of a final judgment the courts
have looked to the record to determine whether the issue has
been, in fact, actually litigated. 110 This requirement of final
judgment is consistent with judicial intent to assure actual fairness to the litigant, while simultaneously promoting judicial efficiency through prevention of wasteful relitigation of issues
previously resolved."'
Accordingly, even though the James findings are made as
part of an "evidentiary" ruling and are not embodied in what
one would traditionally consider a "final" judgment, the sui
generis nature of these findings makes them sufficiently final to
be given collateral estoppel effect." 2 Courts have recognized
that "finality" for the applicability of collateral estoppel is not
109. Oldham v. Pritchett, 599 F.2d 274, 279 (8th Cir. 1979); Laughlin v.

United States, 344 F.2d 187, 189 (D.C. Cir. 1965); RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS
§ 41 (1942).
110. See Continental Can Co., U.S.A. v. Marshall, 603 F.2d 590, 596 (7th
Cir. 1979); In re Merrill, 594 F.2d 1064, 1066 (5th Cir. 1979); Stevenson v. International Paper Co., 516 F.2d 103, 110 (5th Cir. 1975); James Talcott, Inc. v.
Allahabad Bank, Ltd., 444 F.2d 451, 458-59 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
City Trade & Industries, Ltd. v. Allahabad Bank, Ltd., 404 U.S. 940 (1971);
Laughlin v. United States, 344 F.2d 187, 189-90 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
111. See Sherman v. Jacobson, 247 F. Supp. 261, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), quoting Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940). The court stated:
"The final judgment rule is designed to prevent 'enfeebling judicial administration' which would result from 'permitting the harassment and cost of a
succession of separate appeals from the various rulings to which a litigation

may give rise, from its initiation to entry of judgment.'"
112. But see McDonnel v. United States, 455 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1972) (a
mere interlocutory order does not afford a basis for a plea of res judicata);
Murphy v. Andrews, 465 F. Supp. 511 (E.D. Penn. 1979) (motion to suppress
cannot be given collateral estoppel effect). The different treatment accorded interlocutory orders or motions to suppress stems from the fact that
there is not a full hearing on the merits. This is not the situation in Jamestype rulings, which are made after all relevant facts are considered and the
central issue in dispute is fully and completely litigated.
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equated with finality for purposes of appealability. 113 As stated
in Miller Brewing Co. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co.:
Whether a judgment, not "final" in the sense of 28 U.S.C. § 1291,
ought nevertheless be considered "final" in the sense of precluding
further litigation of the same issue, turns upon such factors as the
nature of the decision (i.e., that it was not avowedly tentative), the
adequacy of the hearing, and the opportunity for review. "Finality"
in the context here relevant may mean little more than that the litigation of a particularissue has reached such a stage that a court
sees no really good reasonfor permitting it to be litigated again.114
And, as recognized by the Restatement (Second) of Judgments:
The rules of res judicata are applicable only when a final judgment
is rendered. However, for purposes of issue preclusion (as distinguished from merger and bar), "final judgment" includes any prior
adjudication of an issue in another action between the parties that
to be sufficiently firm to be accorded conclusive efis determined
15
fect.

As stated previously, the finality requirement serves two basic purposes: 11 6 (1) To assure the finding was necessary to the
113. Miller Brewing Co. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 605 F.2d 990, 996 (7th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1102 (1980). See also Zdanok v. Glidden Co.,
327 F.2d 944, 955 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964).
114. 605 F.2d 990, 996 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1102 (1980) (em-

phasis added). See also Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 297

F.2d 80, 89 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 986 (1962); Aiello v. City of
Wilmington, 470 F. Supp. 414 (D. Del. 1979); Autrey v. Chemtrust Indus.
Corp., 362 F. Supp. 1085, 1091 (D. Del. 1973). Cf.Coopers &Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978) (federal appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291
generally depends on existence of decision by federal district court that
ends litigation on merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute

judgment).
For definitions of "final judgment" under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, see also Acha
v. Beame, 570 F.2d 57, 62 (2d Cir. 1978) (final judgment is defined as ending

litigation on the merits); United States v. Mellow Bank, N.A., 545 F.2d 869
(3d Cir. 1976) (findings must not be merely a step toward disposition of the
merits).
115. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS § 41 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973).
See also Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. American Mut. Reins. Co., 459 F. Supp. 859

1978), affd, 600 F.2d 1228 (7th Cir. 1979) (state court's final determi(N.D. Ill.

nation of one issue in a case was entitled to res judicata effect, although the

determination was in the form of an interlocutory decision and not a final
judgment disposing of all issues and appealable by right); Sherman v.
Jacobson', 247 F. Supp. 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
In Sherman, the court recognized and set forth the rationale behind a
flexible "finality rule" for collateral estoppel:
Effectuation of these policies would clearly be hampered if "final" were

given the same meaning in each context. A consistently broad interpretation of the term would flood the appellate courts with piecemeal litigation, while a narrow interpretation would allow a litigant to bring an

endless number of lawsuits. It follows, therefore, that "final" for collateral estoppel purposes must be construed in the light of the considerations of that doctrine, rather than be automatically equated with "final"
in the final judgment rule.
247 F. Supp. at 268.

116. See, e.g., Occidental of Umm All Qaywayn, Inc. v. Cities Serv. Oil
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disposition of the case so as to demonstrate that the issue was
"actually" litigated;117 and (2) to insure the parties recognized
the foreseeability that the finding would have a later preclusive
effect. 118 In the case of James findings, both purposes are met
and these findings should be considered final for collateral estoppel purposes. Thus, the decision in James mandates that the
issue of a defendant's participation in a price-fixing conspiracy
be determined by the trial court after all the evidence has been
presented. 119 There can be no question that the issue was directly considerel by.the 6ourt, or that the findings of membership and conspiracy were mere asides. The issue of the
admissibility of coconspirator statements is central to a pricefixing prosecution. Moreover, in most instances, all persons concerned are aware that civil actions will follow the criminal antitrust case, 120 and it is foreseeable, to say the least, that the
James findings will have a significant impact on subsequent litifindings
are sufficiently firm to be afgation. Clearly, James 12
1
forded preclusive effect.
CONCLUSION

The freeing of collateral estoppel from its primitive base indicates that in the future traditional applications of the doctrine
will be joined by new, innovative applications. 122 The focus will
be on fairness and the need to reduce the load on an
overburdened judiciary. Granting preclusive effect to the findings made in the course of a determination of whether to admit
coconspirator statements merely recognizes the sui genius nature of these findings, and the fact that these findings carry with
them all indicia of fairness and full litigation. Moreover, while it
might appear that the suggestions in this article are "plaintiff
oriented," the application of collateral estoppel to James-type
findings will be useful to defendants in the criminal aspect of
antitrust litigation. Trial courts would become even more careful in ruling on the admissibility of coconspirator statements if
they knew their findings of membership and conspiracy would
bind defendants in subsequent civil litigation. Accordingly,
Co., 396 F. Supp. 461, 467 (W.D.L. 1975); see also Hyman v. Regenstein, 258
F.2d 502, 510 (5th Cir. 1958).
117. Peffer v. Bennet, 523 F.2d 1323, 1326 (10th Cir. 1975).
118. Johnson v. United States, 576 F.2d 606, 615 (5th Cir. 1978); Mosher
Steel Co. v. NLRB, 568 F.2d 436, 440 (5th Cir. 1978).
119. See note 25 and accompanying text supra.
120. See notes 90-93 and accompanying text supra.
121. See notes 113-15 and accompanying text supra.
122. See Comment, Non-mutual CollateralEstoppel in Federal Tax Litigation, 33 VAND. L. REV. 953 (1980).
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fewer coconspirator statements would be admitted, which potentially would lead to fewer convictions. However, it cannot be
doubted that allowing offensive use of collateral estoppel to
James findings would place a powerful tool in the hands of victims of antitrust violations for the vindication of their rights and
the protection of the competitive market.

